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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 1988, Stephen Buckley commenced a civil action seeking
damages under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code' from the
State's Attorney for DuPage County, Illinois, J. Michael Fitzsimmons and
other governmental officials,2 for allegedly fabricating evidence during the
preliminary investigation of a crime in which Buckley had been implicated.3
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to ihe deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
2. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2609 (1993). In his complaint, Buckley
listed seventeen defendants. Id. Fitzsimmons, the State Attorney for DuPage County, Illinois
at the time of Buckley's indictment, was the lead defendant. Id. The other defendants
included the DuPage County Sheriff, members of the Sheriffs police department, several
prosecutors of the State Attorney's office, two experts who analyzed evidence used against
Buckley, the estate of another expert who analyzed evidence, and DuPage County itself. Id.
3. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition to
seeking damages for the falsification of evidence claim, Buckley also contended that
Fitzsimmons violated his liberty rights by making false statements at a press conference
where it was announced that an indictment had been returned against Buckley.. Id. at 1236.
Buckley's complaint stated that everyone who participated in his prosecution was conspiring
to execute him even though they all knew he was innocent. Id. Buckley believed that
1
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The action arose out of Buckley's arrest and subsequent prosecution for the
murder of eleven year old Jeanine Nicarico.'
On February 25, 1983, Jeanine was kidnapped from her home in
Naperville, Illinois, when someone kicked in the front door and carried her
away in a blanket.5 The kidnapper drove Jeanine into the country where
he raped and sodomized her.6 The assailant beat her to death and threw her
body in the mud near a country path.7 Jeanine's body was found two days
later, and an intensive investigation commenced under the direction and
responsibility of the Illinois Sheriffs Department and the Illinois State
Attorney's Office.'
During the investigation, the authorities focused their attention on what
they considered to be a key piece of evidence: a bootprint the killer left on
the door of the Nicaricos' home when he kicked in the door.9 At approxi-
mately the same time in the investigation, a man named Alex Hernandez
told Sheriff's detectives that Buckley had been present during a post-murder
conversation in which Buckley discussed the murder of Nicarico.' °
Fitzsimmons wanted to strengthen his popularity for an upcoming election by quickly solving
the Nicarico murder. Id. Buckley also maintained that the press conference violated his
rights because the community turned against him, and his chances of obtaining bail or
receiving a fair trial were diminished. Id. However, this comment will limit its focus to the
falsification of evidence claim and subsequent decisions because the Supreme Court
unanimously decided that Fitzsimmons was not entitled to absolute immunity for those
statements he made at the press conference. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617-18.
4. Id. at 2609.
5. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
6. Id. The actual account of the crime is that after the kidnapper unsuccessfully
attempted to penetrate Jeanine's vagina, he raped her in the anus. Id.
7. Id. Jeanine's skull was caved in by five blows from either a tire iron or a baseball
bat. Id.
8. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
9. Id.
10. Id. Hernandez was believed to be a mentally disturbed petty thief who was
subsequently arrested and convicted of Jeanine's murder along with Buckley and another man
named Rolando Cruz. Id. Hernandez and Cruz had both admitted to taking part in Jeanine's
abduction but neither confessed to the rape or murder, and both stated that Buckley drove the
car. Id. All three men were arrested and put on trial. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1235. A jury
convicted Hernandez and Cruz of murder, among other charges, and they were sentenced to
death. Id. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the convictions of Cruz and
Hemandez, but in reversing the convictions, the court did not forbid a retrial, concluding that
the evidence was sufficient enough for a jury to find guilt. Id. As a result, Cruz and
Hernandez were retried and Cruz was again found guilty and sentenced to death. Id. The
jury could not reach a verdict regarding Hemandez's guilt or innocence, and his case was
declared a mistrial. Id However, it was announced that the prosecuting attorney would take
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On the basis of the information supplied by Hernandez, detectives
tracked down Buckley and questioned him about the murder," When
detectives specifically asked Buckley if he owned any boots, he admitted to
having boots with soles similar to the print that was left on the door.12
Buckley's boots were examined by three separate experts who gave three
varying opinions. 3  Confronted with these three differing opinions,
prosecutors asked Louise Robbins, an anthropology professor at the
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, to analyze the boots and the
bootprint." Robbins affirmatively concluded that Buckley's boots made
the marks on the Nicarico's door.' Additional pieces of evidence linking
Buckley to the crime were two eyewitnesses; one placed Buckley at the
scene of the abduction and another placed him at the scene of the mur-
der.16
Prosecutors convened a special grand jury for the sole purpose of
investigating the murder. Ten months later, Fitzsimmons announced
Buckley's indictment at a news conference with the basis for the indictment
being Louise Robbins' testimony. 17 Buckley was eventually arrested, and
Hemandez to a third trial. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1235.
11. Id. at 1234. Buckley steadfastly maintained his innocence as to any involvement in
the murder throughout the entire proceedings. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The boots were first examined by John Gorayczyk who was the head of the
identification section in the DuPage County crime laboratory. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
He concluded that although the soles of the boots and the bootprint were the same, Buckley's
boots did not match the bootprint because the heels were a "little" different. Id. The boots
were next analyzed by Edward German, a forensic scientist in the Illinois Crime laboratory.
Id. He determined that Buckley's boots "could have at best" made the bootprint. Id.
Prosecutors then asked Robert Olsen of the Kansas Bureau of Identification to examine the
boots, and he concluded that Buckley's boot "probably" matched the marks on the door. Id.
14. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234. The use of Louise Robbins as an expert was considered
to be controversial as she was thought to be an unreliable scientific evidence expert by other
forensic scientists due to continuing accusations against her alleging that she was willing to
fabricate her testimony. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2610.
15. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234. During later testimony, Robbins stated that she could
identify the wearer of a shoe with certainty even if she only had the prints made with
different shoes. Id.
16. Id. Both eyewitnesses, one who was near the Nicarico's house and the other who
was near the muddy path where Jeanine's body was found, stated that they were positive they
saw Buckley driving a green Ford Granada leaving the neighborhood at the time of the
abduction and arriving at the path near the time of the murder. Id.
17. Buckle)', 113 S. Ct. at 2610-11. Buckley stated in his claim that Fitzsimmons
convened this special grand jury to bolster his campaign and to specifically secure an
indictment against him. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1236.
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his bond was set at three million dollars. 8 Buckley, unable to meet the
bond, remained incarcerated for three years.' 9
At Buckley's first trial, Louise Robbins' testimony about the bootprint
evidence provided the foundation of the prosecution's case against Buckley;
however, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the judge declared a
mistrial. 20 The State decided to retry Buckley, but before the retrial began,
Louise Robbins died.2' As a result, the charges against Buckley were
dismissed, and he was released in March of 1987 after three years of
incarceration.22
In 1988, Buckley filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that
virtually everyone involved with the arrest, investigation, and subsequent
malicious prosecution should pay damages because his constitutional right
to liberty was violated by their actions. 3 The theory of Buckley's case
was that to obtain the indictment against him, the prosecutors fabricated
evidence when they obtained Robbins' opinion about the bootprint
evidence. 4 Fitzsimmons moved to dismiss Buckley's action based on a
claim of absolute immunity.2
In addition, Buckley maintains that the announcement of his indictment by Fitzsimmons
to the press violated his right to liberty because the community turned against him, thereby
diminishing his chances of obtaining bail or receiving a fair trial. Id.
18. Buckley, 113 S. Ct: at 2611.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1235. During the two years between the first trial and the
second trial, Buckley remained in prison. In addition, as preparations were being made for
Buckley's retrial, a man named Brian Dugan who had recently been arrested for the
kidnapping, molestation, and murder of a seven year old girl, confessed to Jeanine's murder;
however, prosecutors in DuPage County determined that the confession was unreliable. Id.
22. Id. The prosecution found themselves in a bind because no other expert was willing
to testify that the bootprint evidence positively confirmed Buckley's guilt. Id.
23. Id.
24. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2610. Buckley's contention is that the prosecutors
manufactured false evidence linking Buckley's boot to the bootprint by shopping around for
experts until they found one who would provide them with the opinion they wanted. Id. at
2615.
25. Id. at 2611. Immunity is defined as the "freedom or exemption from a charge, duty,
obligation . . . penalty ... as granted by law to a person or class of persons," and as "a
freedom granted to a special category of persons from the normal burdens and duties arising
out of a legal relationship with other persons." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1130-31 (15th ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
The importance of the immunity concept in this scenario rests on its implications at the
procedural level. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). Absolute immunity
defeats a suit at the outset, provided the official's actions were within the scope of the
1922 Vol. 18
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The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, held that the prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity with
respect to the claim based on the alleged fabrication of evidence. 6 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that the prosecutors had absolute immunity." The court concluded
that the fabricated evidence could have only caused injury at the judicial
phase, and therefore, the prosecutors were entitled to, and protected by,
absolute prosecutorial immunity. 2 The court reasoned that conversations
between the prosecutors and the bootprint evidence expert may not be the
foundation of liability because the out-of-court evaluation of evidence from
an expert witness causes no injury independent from that which transpires
in the courtroom. 29  Thus, "[p]rosecutors whose out-of-court acts cause
injury only to the extent a case proceeds will be brought to heel adequately
by the court,"30 and the defendant who has suffered the injury must rely
on the pending court to protect his interests." Buckley appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court and the Court granted his
immunity. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974). However, an official with qualified immunity must depend upon
the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established at trial, to determine whether
he is liable for the claims against him. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 239. Under this form of
immunity, government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of
their duties when their actions do not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982).
26. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611. The district court stated that absolute immunity should
be extended to the prosecutors effort to link the bootprint evidence to Buckley because that
act was in the nature of evaluating evidence for the purpose of initiating a criminal
proceeding. Id. The court further stated that the concept of absolute immunity covers the
entire investigation of a case which includes meetings with witnesses, presentation of
evidence to a grand jury, and the decision on whether or not to prosecute. Buckley, 919 F.2d
at 1243.
27. Id. at 1244. However, the court of appeals reversed the district court, and ruled that
the prosecutors were also entitled to the protection of absolute immunity with regard to the
press statements. Id. at 1242.
28. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611.
29. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1243-44.
30. Id. at 1242.
31. Id. at 1:241. In addition to looking to the court to protect the defendant's interests,
in this scenario, the defendant also has the opportunity to utilize his own expert witnesses at
trial to rebut the expert testimony presented by the prosecution.
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petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for
further proceedings.32
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its
decision.33 Buckley again appealed the court's decision, claiming that
absolute prosecutorial immunity only applies to the act of initiating the
prosecution and to acts that occur inside the courtroom during the presenta-
tion of the State's case.34 The Supreme Court once again granted certiorari
and reversed the court of appeals decision, holding that the prosecutors were
not entitled to absolute immunity,35 thereby allowing Buckley to seek
damages from the prosecutor for the alleged falsification of evidence.
This comment will focus on the potential harmful ramifications this
decision will have, as well as the contradictory nature of the decision itself.
Part II will discuss the doctrine of immunity, from the immunity granted to
those officials from common law liability, to the immunity afforded
governmental officials under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Part III will
specifically examine the historical development of prosecutorial immunity,
from the common law tradition of prosecutorial immunity, to a survey of the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals' handling of the prosecutorial immunity
issues, and finally to Supreme Court precedent dealing with the issue of
prosecutorial immunity. Part IV will focus on the reasoning the Supreme
Court proffered in its holding in Buckley. Part V will criticize the
majority's decision in light of previous Supreme Court decisions which
clearly indicate that the prosecutors' actions in Buckley should have been
afforded the protection of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Furthermore,
this part will discuss the possible effects and harmful ramifications Buckley
will have on prosecutors and the public. Part VI will conclude that absolute
immunity should have been afforded to the prosecutors in Buckley in light
of the historical, common law, and case law support for extending absolute
immunity to those acts undertaken by the prosecutors.
32. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2612. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of
appeals in light of their recent decision in Bums v. Reed, I I I S. Ct. 1934 (1991). Burns,
discussed more in depth later in this comment, dealt with absolute prosecutorial immunity and
was decided after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had already rendered its decision.
See infra pp. 1932-33 and note 95.
33. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 952 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The court held
that Burns did not undermine its initial decision that prosecutors are absolutely immune for
"normal preparatory steps." Id. at 966.
34. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2615, 2620.
35. Id. at 2612. The Court limited its inquiry to the issue of prosecutorial immunity in
regard to the bootprint evidence and the statements made to the press. See supra note 3.
1924 Vol. 18
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II. DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY
Courts have granted immunity from liability to certain classes of federal
and state officials based on their status as government officials. This
immunity is based principally on the special status of the defendant as a
government entity, and is grounded in the belief that even though the
defendant may have committed a wrong, there exist greater social concerns
that mandate the defendant escape liability.36
When a court grants immunity to an official, it does not deny that a tort
exists. It deems that the defendant may not be subjected to a suit for the
alleged wrong based solely on the defendant's function as a government
official."
The courts recognize two types of immunity: absolute and qualified.3"
An official who has been granted absolute immunity is not subject to a tort
action provided his actions are deemed to be within the scope of his duties
as a government official, even if his actions are intentional or malicious.39
However, an official with qualified immunity is immune from liability if his
actions are within the scope of his authority and are performed in good
faith.40
The doctrine of immunity from common law liability is well settled and
firmly establishes thatjudicial officers acting within the scope of their duties
are immune from liability.4' The grant of absolute immunity to judges, 42
36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at
1032 (5th ed. 1984).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1979).
38. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1982). The Court noted that
"[olur decisions have recognized immunity defenses of two kinds:" absolute and qualified.
Id. at 807. The Court went on to state that absolute immunity applies to those officials
whose status requires "complete protection from suit" and that qualified immunity is the
normal standard for executive officials in general. Id.
39. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 n.12.
40. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48 (however, in Harlow, the Court modifies this standard
with regards to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. section 1983).
41. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418, 424. The common law tradition of affording absolute
immunity to prosecutors for acts committed within the scope of their duties was found to be
preserved in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554-55 (1967).
42. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20. The Supreme Court accepted the rule of judicial
immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871). The Court has since described the grant
of judicial immunity as follows:
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity
of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley
Platz 1925
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grand jurors,43 and prosecutors," for acts within the scope of their official
capacities has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law.
Courts have recognized these types of immunities to protect the public
interest by allowing those officials who were immune from liability to
perform their duties without the fear of retaliatory lawsuits.45
Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, government officials acting under the
color of state law may be held personally liable for acts that deprive any
person of constitutionally protected rights.46 On its face, section 1983
grants no immunities.47 However, the United States Supreme Court has
held that certain government officials performing certain functions should
be afforded immunity from liability under section 1983 suits.4" The Court
has further held that it is the function the government official performed, not
his status, which determines whether an immunity defense is available to
that official. 9
A government official may be granted the defense of absolute
immunity and thereby be shielded from a section 1983 action if the
official's function passes the standard set forth by the Supreme Court.50
The Court states that "where the immunity claimed by the defendant was
well established at the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted, where
its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we
have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity."'" Therefore, if
the official's function satisfies that standard, it will be "incorporated" into
section 1983, and the official can successfully claim the defense of absolute
immunity.52 Accordingly, the Court has recognized absolute immunity
v. Fisher. This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a
malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interests it
is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with indepen-
dence and without fear of consequences."
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 355).
43. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880).
44. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
45. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 n.12.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
47. Id.
48. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
49. Forrestor v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342
(1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978).
50. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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from section 1983 suits for judges,53 witnesses,54 and prosecutors. 5' The
Court has reasoned that the same underlying justifications mandating
absolute immunity from liability in common law tort suits also apply to
section 1983 actions.56
The majority of cases regarding government official's immunity from
section 1983 liability have involved prosecutors and other officials with
functions that the courts have designated as "quasi-judicial.""57 The Court
stated that it is the "functional comparability of their judgments to those of
the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being
" 58referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers....
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
The common law immunity of a prosecutor is derived from the same
considerations that form the common law grant of immunity to judicial
officers acting within the scope of their duties.59 One reason is a prose-
cutor's concern about harassment from retaliatory lawsuits that would inhibit
prosecutors from utilizing their lawyering skills to fully perform their
duties.6" This recognition that the common law tradition of judicial
immunity is extended to prosecutors ensures that prosecutors do not have to
be intimidated by the threat of civil litigation. Furthermore, it guarantees
that a prosecutor can retain and exercise the "independence of judgment
required by his public trust."6! In addition, judicial immunity extends to
prosecutors because prosecutors, like judges, are integrally involved in the
53. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. The Court determined that judicial immunity is essential
to protect the judicial process and is therefore preserved under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Id.
54. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 325. The Court reasoned there was nothing in the legislative
history of section 1983 that indicated an intention to abrogate common law witness immunity.
Id.
55. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55. The Court determined the common law tradition
of affording absolute immunity to prosecutors for acts committed within the scope of their
duties was found to be preserved in claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See id.
56. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. The Court stated that "[section] 1983 is to be read in
harmony with general principals of tort immunities and defenses rather that in derogation of
them." Id.
57. Id. at 423 n.20.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 422-23.
60. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423.
61. Id.
1994] 1927
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judicial process and also exercise discretionary judgment on the basis of
evidence presented to them.62
In light of the immunity historically granted to prosecutors at common
law, as well as the policy interests supporting prosecutorial immunity, state
prosecutors have been deemed to be absolutely immune from liability under
42 U.S.C. section 1983 for their conduct in commencing prosecutorial
proceedings and in presenting the State's case,6" as long as that conduct is
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."64
Yet, before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Buckley, the
question of whether absolute immunity protected certain preparatory actions
undertaken by a prosecutor before an indictment had been filed had
remained unanswered.65 The United States Courts of Appeal have declined
to establish a "bright line" test based on the commencement of judicial
proceedings, and have applied absolute immunity to several acts that
prosecutors perform, including those that have occurred prior to an
indictment.
66
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has divided the pre-
litigation actions of prosecutors into two categories. 67 The first category
involves those acts considered to be of a police nature and includes the
supervision of and participation with law enforcement agencies in acquiring
evidence that might be used during a prosecution. 6' Therefore, those
officials whose acts fall into this category would only be entitled to qualified
immunity. 69  The second category, categorized as prosecutorial in nature,
involves the organization, evaluation, and supervision of evidence that will
enable the prosecutor to decide whether or not to commence with judicial
proceedings.70 Accordingly, these functions qualify for absolute immuni-
ty.71 The Second Circuit has also extended absolute immunity to a
62. Id. at n.20. The Court notes it is this functional comparison of a prosecutor's
discretionary judgment to that of judges that has resulted in prosecutors being labeled as
"quasi-judicial" officers, and the immunity they are entitled to is also referred to in those
terms. Id.
63. Id. at 431.
64. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
65. Id. at 431 n.33.
66. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1987); Powers v. Coe, 728
F.2d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 1984).
67. Barbera, 836 F.2d at 100.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id
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prosecutor's actions during the plea bargaining stage of a proceeding despite
misrepresentations by the prosecutor of certain facts.72
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that providing
advice to law enforcement officials concerning the existence of probable
cause and the legality of subsequent arrests is within the protected scope of
prosecutorial immunity.73 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held that
commencing proceedings to terminate parental rights without notice to the
natural father is protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.7" Addition-
ally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has established that the act
of intimidating a plaintiff by continuing prosecutorial proceedings against
him unless he agreed to dismiss a damage suit he had filed against a
prosecutor was a protected prosecutorial function.7"
The United States Courts of Appeal have also established that the
prosecution's pre-indictment securing of evidence, whether through the
interrogation of witnesses or through other means, qualifies for absolute
immunity because these acts are essential to the prosecutorial functions of
pre-trial preparation.76 Specifically, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when the
coercion of false testimony leads to an indictment.77 The court reasoned
that the same injurious result from the decision to prosecute must flow from
the initiation of the criminal proceedings.7" The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has stated that the interviewing of witnesses by prosecutors
72. Taylor v. Kavanaugh, 640 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1981). In Taylor, the prosecutor
lied to the defendant and to the court during the plea bargaining phase of the judicial
proceedings, stating that an indictment had been returned by the grand jury when no such
indictment had been handed down. Id. at 45 1. The state attorney during this plea bargaining
stage also reneged on a promise he had made to the defendant that he would not make a
recommendation relating to the sentence to be imposed. Id.
73. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir. 1987).
74. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1980). In Martin, a man who
had been arrested for the murder of his wife sought damages from a variety of governmental
officials, including the District Attorney, claiming that he had not been given adequate notice
of the termination proceedings and accordingly, had been deprived of due process. Id. The
court stated that the claim against the District Attorney was barred by absolute immunity
because the acts complained of occurred as part of the initiation and prosecution of the
State's case. Id.
75. McGruder v. Necaise, 733 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984).
76. Myers, 810 F.2d at 1446; Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
77. Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 861 (1980).
78. Id.
19941 1929
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before presenting their testimony to a grand jury, is also protected by
absolute immunity.79
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has similarly
established that the act of conferring with a potential witness for the
determination of whether or not to file charges is entitled to absolute
immunity. 0 Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
determined that certain case preparation that is deemed "investigative" can
be regarded as a necessary part of the prosecutorial function and thus
qualifies for absolute immunity protection.8'
Supreme Court precedent has firmly established that the principles for
determining whether certain actions of government officials are entitled to
immunity have their basis in historical practice, and have resulted in a
functional approach test being applied to determine whether or not immunity
should be afforded to those actions.82 The Court has stated that the
"immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the
defendant." 3 The various functions that the prosecutor must perform in
his role as advocate for the State are the essence of the functional ap-
proach. 4 Yet, prior to the Buckley decision, the Supreme Court has only
79. Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1127 (1985). The court reasoned that the act of conferring with witnesses for this purpose
is necessary for the preparation for trial. Id.
81. Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (10th Cir. 1977).
82. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2620; Burns, I I I S. Ct. at 1935; Forrester,484 U.S. at 224;
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1986); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201
(1985); Briscoe,460 U.S. at 342; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810; Butz, 438 U.S. at 511-13; Imbler,
424 U.S. at 420-25.
83. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342.
84. Note, Delimiting the Scope of Prosecutorial Immunity From Section 1983 Damage
Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173, 187 (1977). The note goes on to state that a prosecutor's
duties can be divided into seven general categories: 1) Quasi-judicial or prosecutorial duties,
considered to be the most important duties, include decisions on whether or not to prosecute;
2) Executive or administrative duties that consist mostly of office duties; 3) Investigatory
duties, similar to those undertaken by the police, may include the gathering of evidence and
being involved in the investigation of criminal activities; 4) Ministerial duties include those
matters in which a prosecutor cannot exercise his own discretionary judgment, such as
complying with court orders; 5) Advisory acts include the giving of advice to other
governmental officials and providing legal opinions; 6) Official public duties can comprise
a vast scope of activities that can range from attending public activities, making speeches, and
testifying at public hearings; and 7) Individual acts include job-related activities, like
campaigning, as well as those acts that are strictly personal in nature. Id at 187-88. The
functional approach only extends absolute prosecutorial immunity to those acts falling under
the quasi-judicial category. Id. at 188.
Vol. 181930
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had two opportunities to utilize the functional approach test to specifically
address the liability of prosecutors in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983."
In Imbhr v. Pachtman,86 the Supreme Court first established that a
prosecutor is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 for alleged deprivation of an accused's constitutional
rights.87 In Imbler, the Court held that a state prosecuting attorney is
absolutely immune from liability in "initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case.""8  The Court focused upon the functional
nature of a prosecutor's activities rather than his status as a prosecutor, and
stated that those activities which are "intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process" are the type of functions that absolute
immunity should apply to with full force.89 The Court reasoned that
although this immunity would leave the "genuinely wronged" criminal
85. However, the first American case to address the question of a prosecutor's immunity
to a suit for malicious prosecution was Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
Despite allegations of malice, the Supreme Court of Indiana dismissed the action on the
ground that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 1002.
86. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
87. Id. at 409. In Imbler, the petitioner was charged with murdering the owner of a Los
Angeles market. Id. at 411. The State's case against Imbler consisted of identification
testimony from three men who claimed to have seen the victim's assailants fleeing the scene
and eyewitness testimony from the victim's wife. Id. Imbler was eventually convicted of
the murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 412.
After the Supreme Court of California refused to overturn the conviction, the man who
had prosecuted Imbler, the respondent in the case, wrote to the governor of California
claiming that he, along with a state correctional investigator, had discovered new evidence
after the trial had been completed. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 412. The new evidence consisted of
corroborating witnesses for Imbler's alibi, as well as indications that one of the prime
witnesses was less than trustworthy. Id. It was also noted that leads to some of this
information had been available before trial but had not been developed. Id. at 412-13.
Imbler then obtained his release from prison through federal habeas corpus proceedings when
it was determined that the prosecuting attorney had knowingly used false testimony and
suppressed evidence that was favorable to the defendant. Id. at 413-15.
After several unsuccessful appeals by the state, Imbler filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, alleging that prosecutor Pachtman and other governmental officials unlawfully
conspired among themselves to deprive Imbler of his liberty. Id. at 416. The basis of
Imbler's complaint was that the prosecutor had intentionally and negligently allowed false
testimony to be given. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416.
The district court held that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from liability, and
the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 414-16.
88. Id. at 431.
89. Id. at 430.
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defendant without any type of civil action against the prosecutor whose
improper actions deprived him of his liberty, the alternative of only
affording a prosecutor the protection of qualified immunity would "prevent
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is
essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." 9
The Court, however, did not attempt to draw a line between those
functions that a prosecutor undertakes in his preparation for the initiation of
the criminal process and for trial and those functions that require a
prosecutor to act as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court.9'
The Court recognized that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as
advocate for the State "involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a
prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom." 92 As a result, the Court
left the door open for further debate as to what prosecutorial acts would fall
under the broad categorization of allowing absolute prosecutorial immunity
for "initiating [and pursuing] a [criminal] prosecution" 93 and "presenting
the State's case.
94
In 1991, the Court revisited the issue of prosecutorial immunity in
Burns v. Reed.9 The Burns Court applied the "functional" test analysis of
90. Id. at 427-28.
91. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
92. Id. The court noted that preparation for both the initiation of the criminal process
and for a trial may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. Id.
93. Id. at 43 1.
94. Id
95. 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991). In Burns, petitioner Cathy Bums had called the police to
report that an assailant had entered her house, knocked her unconscious, and shot and
wounded her two sons. Id. at 1937. Bums eventually became the prime suspect, even
though she passed a lie-detector test and repeatedly denied any involvement in the attack.
Id. It was then suspected that Bums had multiple personalities, one of whom had perpetrated
the attack on her sons. Id.
The police sought the advice of state prosecutor Reed to see if it would be a
permissible investigative technique to hypnotize Bums to determine if she did suffer from
multiple personalities, and if so, to elicit if one of the personalities was the assailant. Id
While Burns was hypnotized she referred both to herself and to the assailant as "Katie."
Burns, I I I S. Ct. at 1937. The police regarded this as support for their multiple personality
theory, and once again sought the advice of the state prosecutor for a probable cause
determination, who told them that they "probably had probable cause" to arrest her. Id. On
the basis of this assurance, Bums was arrested. Id.
During a subsequent probable cause hearing, one of the officers testified, in response
to prosecutor's Reed's questions, that Burns had confessed to the attack; however, neither the
officer, nor Reed, informed the judge that the confession was obtained while Bums was under
hypnosis. Id. Bums was ultimately charged with attempted murder, but she successfully
moved to suppress the statements elicited while she was under hypnosis, and the charges were
1932 Vol. 18
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Imbler to further define the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.96
The Court held that a state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from
liability for damages for his appearance as an advocate for the State during
a probable cause hearing, where the prosecutor examined a witness and
successfully supported the search warrant application. 97
The Court found support for this grant of absolute immunity both in the
common law and in the policy concerns stated in Imbler.9" The Court
reasoned that the prosecutor's appearance before the judge and the
presentation of evidence in support of an application for a search warrant
"clearly involves the prosecutor's role as advocate for the State."99
However, the Court also held that absolute immunity from liability for
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 did not apply to the prosecutor's act
of giving legal advice to the police."'0 The Court noted that there was no
historical or common law support for extending absolute immunity to such
actions.'0 ' The Court explained the risk of vexatious litigation was not
present for this act because a defendant is not likely to be aware of the
prosecutor's role in giving advice as compared to a prosecutor's role in
initiating and conducting a prosecution.' "Absolute immunity is de-
signed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation
associated with litigation.' 03  Therefore, only those actions that are related
to the prosecutor's role in the judicial process justify the protection of
absolute prosecutorial immunity.'0 4
dropped. Id. 'Bums then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 seeking compensatory
damages for the alleged violations of her Constitutional rights. Burns, I I I S. Ct. at 1937.
The district court granted Reed a directed verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed,
holding that prosecutor Reed was absolutely immune from liability for giving legal advice
to the police and for his conduct at the probable cause hearing. Id. at 1937-38.
96. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2614.
97. Burns, III S. Ct. at 1940.
98. Id. at 1941. The Court noted that the "duties of the prosecutor in his functional role
as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution." Id.
(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. 431 n.33 (1976)).
99. Burns, III S. Ct. at 1942.
100. Id. at 1944-45. Prosecutor Reed advised the police that they could question Bums
while under hypnosis to try to asses whether she possessed multiple personalities and to
determine if one of those personalities was the assailant. Id. at 1937.
101. Id. at 1942.
102. Id. at 1943.
103. Burns, I I S. Ct. at 1943.
104. Id.
19941 1933
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IV. THE BUCKLEY DECISION
In 1993, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to define and further
specify what prosecutorial actions are protected under the umbrella of
absolute immunity. In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,"5 the Court, in a five to
four decision, narrowly held that prosecutors may be sued for damages
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for their participation in the investigative
stage of a criminal case." 6 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the
majority, stated that the prosecutors' actions in trying to determine whether
the bootprint had been made by the petitioner's foot was investigative in
character and therefore was not protected by absolute immunity." 7 The
Court noted that their decision in Burns clarified the principle that "[a]
prosecutor's administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do
not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or
for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.'10 8
However, the Court also reiterated the well established principle that
those prosecutorial acts which are in preparation for trial or for the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings and occur in the prosecutor's role as
advocate for the State are entitled to absolute immunity.'0 9 The Court
further noted that those acts which are entitled to the protection of absolute
immunity must include "the professional evaluation of the evidence
assembled by the police" and any other preparations undertaken for
presentation at trial or before a grand jury."0 Yet, instead of recognizing
that the evaluation of the bootprint evidence fell under the protection of
absolute immunity, the Court chose to compare the actions of the prosecutor
to that of a detective searching for clues and corroboration that might give
him probable cause to recommend an arrest."' The Court, by classifying
the prosecutor's actions of having the bootprint evidence examined by an
expert witness as that of a detective "searching for clues," had no choice but
105. 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993).
106. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2617.
107. Id. at 2616-17.
108. Id. at 2615.
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that it was the police, not the
prosecutors, who acquired the bootprint evidence. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234. Accordingly,
the opinion rendered by Louise Robbins should have been regarded as evaluative, not
investigative, because the steps undertaken by the prosecutors in eliciting the testimony of
the forensic experts, and specifically Louise Robbins, was to evaluate and determine if
Buckley had made the bootprint. See discussion infra pp. 1936-38.
111. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616.
1934 Vol. 18
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to determine that the prosecutors were only entitled to qualified immuni-
ty." 2 It was this classification where the Court made its error.
The Buckley Court also drew the distinction between evaluating
evidence and interviewing witnesses in preparation for trial, which are
advocacy functions, and participating in an investigation for evidence that
could provide probable cause for an arrest, which is an investigative
function."' The Court, in utilizing this distinction, determined that the
alleged manufacture of evidence was part investigatory in nature because the
prosecutors' actions involving the bootprint evidence occurred before the
prosecutors claimed to have probable cause to arrest Buckley or to initiate
judicial proceedings against him." 4 The Court went on to state that "[a]
prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before
he has probable cause to have anyone arrested."'"1
5
However, the Court quickly retreated from what appeared to be a
"bright line" test of distinguishing activities before and after the probable
cause determination. The Court noted that "a determination of probable
cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for
all actions taken afterwards.""' 6
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BUCKLEY DECISION
As previously indicated, Supreme Court precedent has created a
standard that, allows prosecutors to remain absolutely immune from a suit
seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for actions a prosecutor
undertakes in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case at
trial." 7 The Court has also acknowledged that because the "duties of the
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary
to the initiation of a prosecution" and involve actions that take place outside
112. Id. Since a detective or a law enforcement agent would only be entitled to
qualified immunity, a prosecutor whose actions are comparable to those that a detective
would perform should only be afforded the same type of immunity because the focus is on
the functional nature of the actions, not on the status of the defendant. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2616.
116. Id. al: n.5.
117. Burns, Ill S. Ct. at 1934; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409. See discussion supra p. 1930-
1994] 1935
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of the courtroom, the protection of absolute immunity should also apply to
those actions.8
Accordingly, state prosecutors' attempts to link the bootprint evidence
to Buckley should be described as actions undertaken in preparation for trial.
In Buckley, Justice Anthony Kennedy's dissent emphasizes that "the decision
to use a witness" during any phase of the prosecution, "must be insulated
from liability."" 9 He further explained that this decision should not be
hampered by the damaging effects of a potential lawsuit. 20
Justice Kennedy notes how the bootprint evidence was a critical part
of the prosecution's case and that the consultations with the various experts
are "best viewed as a step to ensure the bootprint's admission into evidence
and to bolster its probative value in the eyes of the jury."'' Therefore,
the prosecutors' actions in obtaining, reviewing, and ultimately utilizing the
expert witness testimony should have been regarded as a function of the
prosecutor in his duties as an advocate for the State.'22
The majority's categorization of the prosecution's attempt to link the
bootprint evidence to Buckley through the use of an expert witness as
investigative in nature is incorrect when a careful look at the chronological
order of events is taken. According to the allegations, Buckley was first
implicated in the crime by Alex Hemandez.'23 This initial connection to
the crime was independent of the bootprint evidence. 24  Therefore, it
could be argued that the purpose of the development of the bootprint
evidence was to corroborate the information supplied by Hernandez.'25
The focus then becomes whether the prosecutors' attempt to obtain evidence
linking Buckley to the bootprint was to acquire evidence or to evaluate the
quality of the evidence already obtained. The bootprint evidence and the
implication by Hernandez were both acquired before the State Attorney's
office consulted with Louise Robbins to try to identify the evidence
118. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (emphasis added).
119. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2621 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2621-22.
121. Id. at 2621.
122. Id. Justice Kennedy reiterates this point by quoting Imbler. He writes, "actions
in 'obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating' witness testimony . . . are a classic function of
the prosecutor." Id. (citations omitted).
123. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
124. Id. Hernandez stated that he, along with Buckley, was present at a conversation
where the murder of Jeanine Nicarico was discussed. Id. There was never any mention of
the bootprint evidence. See id
125. This point is all the more realistic when it is noted that Hernandez was known to
be mentally disturbed and to have a criminal history of committing petty crimes. Id.
1936 Vol. 18
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positively.' 26 As a result, this attempt to identify the bootprint evidence
should have been classified as evaluative in nature and afforded the full
protection of absolute immunity. 27
The majority opinion is additionally flawed due to the fact that the
analysis proffered by the Court in its decision has the potential for diluting
the standard set forth in Imbler and Burns into nothing more than a mere
pleading rule. 2 ' If preparatory actions, like the ones undertaken by the
prosecutors in Buckley, are unprotected by absolute immunity, any criminal
defendant can institute civil proceedings against the prosecutor by simply
reframing a claim to attack the preparatory actions instead of those
prosecutorial actions that are protected by absolute immunity. 29 Allowing
the protection of absolute immunity to be avoided simply through a pleading
mechanism circumvents the protection that the Court found necessary to
establish in hnbler and Burns.3 '
This reasoning stems from the fact that almost every action which takes
place inside the courtroom requires timely and intensive preparatory
measures that have taken place outside of the courtroom. These out-of-court
measures include "substantial and necessary out-of-court conduct by the
prosecutor in evaluating the evidence and preparing for its introduction [at
trial]."'' Justice Kennedy referred to this reasoning as even more funda-
mental than that stated by the Court for rejecting Buckley's argument that
Imbler only applies to in-court conduct and to the commencement of a
prosecution. 112
In addition, the Supreme Court has looked to historical and common
law support as one of the factors needed for extending the protection of
absolute immunity to certain prosecutorial actions."' The common law
126. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1234.
127. This theory was not proffered by Justice Kennedy in his dissent, but it is indicative
of his attempt to show that consultations with expert witnesses at every stage of a judicial
proceeding should be viewed as evaluative in nature and ultimately as preparation for trial.
See Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2620-25 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2620-21.
129. Id. at 2621; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34.
130. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2621.
131. Id.
132. Id. The majority rejected Buckley's claim that the protection of absolute immunity
for a prosecutor's conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case "only
extend[s] to the act of initiation itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom." Id. at
2615.
133. Burns., Ill S. Ct. at 1941-42. In Burns, the Court refused to grant absolute
immunity to a prosecutor's act of giving advice to the police because neither the prosecutor
1994] 1937
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immunized a prosecutor, like other lawyers, from civil liability for eliciting
false or defamatory testimony from witnesses.'34 Therefore, in light of
this common law support, the prosecutors in Buckley, by eliciting the
testimony from Louise Robbins, even if it was false, should have been
afforded absolute immunity for their alleged acts of falsifying evidence
through the use of false witness testimony. 135
Furthermore, the Court, in concluding that the actions of the prosecu-
tors in regard to the bootprint evidence were not protected by absolute
immunity, has superimposed "a bright-line standard onto the functional
approach that has guided" the Court's previous decisions.13 1 Imbler
created the well established principle that prosecutors were not subject to
suit for malicious prosecution.' 37 Yet, the Court has created the apparent
notion that a claim for malicious prosecution is no longer subject to
immediate dismissal on the grounds of absolute immunity where a civil
plaintiff is "clever enough to include [in the claim for damages] some
actions taken by the prosecutor prior to the initiation of prosecution."' 3
As a result, this "classic case" scenario that has consistently been afforded
the protection of absolute immunity may now fall on the unprotected side
of the Court's "new dividing line."' 39
The Court, in its decision, also criticized the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding that when "courts can curtail the costs of prosecutorial
blunders ...by cutting short the prosecution or mitigating its effects,"' 4
"damages remedies are unnecessary.""' Therefore, "if the injury flows
from the initiation or prosecution of the case, then the prosecutor is immune
and the defendant must look to the court in which the case pends to protect
nor the lower court identified any common law or historical support for extending absolute
immunity to such actions. Id. at 1942.
134. See, e.g., Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 1941; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 401-02 (2d Cir.
1926); Youmans v. Smith, 47 N.E. 265 (N.Y. 1897); Griffith, 44 N.E. at 1002.
135. Buckley claimed that the prosecutors specifically chose Robbins because they knew
she would testify, even if it meant testifying falsely, that Buckley made the bootprint on
Nicarico's door. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2615.
136. Id. at 2622. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy explains that the Court, in
it's majority opinion, has created a true anomaly by stating that a prosecutor should not
consider himself to be an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.
Id.
137. Id. at 2623.
138. Id.
139. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Buckley, 919 F.2d at 1241.
141. Id. at 1240.
1938 Vol. 1 8
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his interests."'' 2 Thus, "prosecutors whose out-of-court acts cause injury
only to the extent a case proceeds" are entitled to absolute immunity."'
The Supreme Court called this theory "unprecedented" and contrary to the
Court's approach of focusing on the conduct for which immunity is
extended.' However, this "source of the injury" theory is consistent
with, and supported by, Supreme Court precedent.'45 This precedent was
established to ensure that the full spectrum of prosecutorial actions that are
intertwined and closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process are afforded the protection of absolute immunity. 46
Finally, the decision was flawed because of the damaging effects and
harmful ramifications the Buckley decision will have on a prosecutor's
ability to fully perform his duties. Prosecutorial immunity was created to
ensure that prosecutors "will be guided solely by their sense of public
responsibility"' rather than by a sense of fear of civil liability. 47 However,
the Court's decision in Buckley will have a chilling effect on those
prosecutors who may have been otherwise willing to be somehow engaged
in the full investigation of those cases that they will ultimately present at
trial. A prosecutor's concern about the potential liability arising from
pretrial consultations with witnesses could hamper his judgment as to
whether certain witnesses should be used. 48 This fear of liability during
the initial phase of a prosecutor's work "could interfere with his exercise of
independent judgment at every phase of his work, since the prosecutor might
come to see later decisions in terms of their effect on his potential liability."'
4 9
As a result, this lingering threat of liability may cause a prosecutor to
act with an undue sense of caution that will impede upon his independent
142. Id. at 1241.
143. Id. at 1242.
144. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2611.
145. Respondent's Brief at 20, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606 (1993) (No.
91-7849).
146. Id. The respondent's brief notes that the prosecutor in Imbler allegedly had a
police sketch altered to more closely resemble Imbler after the investigation focused upon
him. Id. Respondent argues that this out-of-court preparation is more investigatory in nature
than the falsifying of evidence alleged in Buckley. Id. at 21. Yet, the prosecutor's actions
in Imbler were slill afforded the protection of absolute immunity, presumably because the
injury that Imbler attributed to the altered sketch occurred when it was used at trial in order
to aid the prosecution in convicting him. Id. This line of reasoning should have been
analogized to the use of Louise Robbins' testimony.
147. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987);
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
148. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2621; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n.24.
149. Buckley, 113 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343 (1986)).
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judgment. 5 ' The ability of an attorney to vigorously and fearlessly
perform his duties utilizing his own judgment is imperative to a state
prosecutor, whose position requires that he serve the public's interest in the
most competent way possible.' 5' This ability of a prosecutor to perform
his or her duties fully and without reservation is "essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.' 52
VI. CONCLUSION
The notion and belief that "no bad deed should go unpunished" is one
that has entrenched itself into societies throughout history. Yet, prosecutors
have been afforded immunity protection in certain situations. Even if they
do something wrong, the law has stated that they shall go unpunished. In
performing their duties as public servants and in performing their duties as
advocates for the State, prosecutors have been afforded the protection of
absolute immunity for those functions in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution.' 5  However, since the dividing line between a prosecutor's
acts in preparing for those functions, some of which would be absolutely
immune, and his administrative or investigative acts, which would not,'54
has yet to be clearly defined, the question of what acts are protected by
absolute immunity is yet to be completely answered.
Nonetheless, the historical and common law tradition of prosecutorial
immunity, combined with state, federal, and Supreme Court precedent, have
established a standard by which the determination of what acts are to be
afforded the protection of absolute immunity is to be decided. Accordingly,
the standard that has been established is that those acts undertaken by a
prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or in
preparing for trial and that occur in the course of his role as a public servant
as advocate for the State are entitled to the protection of absolute immunity.
The attorneys in Buckley were functioning as prosecutors in eliciting the
testimony from Louise Robbins. They were preparing for the initiation of
criminal proceedings against Buckley. Even if the testimony they received
from Louise Robbins was false and maliciously utilized, the prosecutors'
150. Id.
151. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
152. Id. at 427-28.
153. Id. at 421.
154. Id. at 431 n.33.
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acts still should have been afforded absolute immunity because those acts
were prosecutorial functions.
Although such immunity leaves the genuinely wronged criminal
defendant without any civil redress against the prosecutor or prosecutors
who intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his liberty, the alternative
of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would harm the public with which he
has a duty to serve. 155 "It would prevent the vigorous and fearless perfor-
mance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of
the criminal justice system . .. .""'
As a result of the Court's determination that the apparent preparatory
steps undertaken by the prosecution were not protected by absolute
immunity and because of the rationalization that they were more investiga-
tive in nature, a chilling effect on prosecutors will no doubt arise in their
willingness to fully involve themselves in a case. As Judge Learned Hand
emphatically stated in his frequently quoted passage regarding prosecutorial
immunity:
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between
the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave undressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation.'57
155. The immunity of a prosecutor from liability for damages in civil suits under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 does not leave the public without a course of criminal redress to assure
the public that this type of immunity does not place certain governmental officials above the
law. Title 18, section 242 of the United States Code is the criminal equivalent of 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 and provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute or ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
In addition, a prosecutor is also subject to disciplinary actions imposed by his peers.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.8 (1989).
156. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-28.
157. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
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The Supreme Court in Buckley should have realized that they have now
subjected those prosecutors who are faithfully performing their prosecutorial
functions to this constant fear of retaliation.
Deborah S. Platz
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